Abstract. We present MQQ-SIG, a signature scheme based on "Multivariate Quadratic Quasigroups". The MQQ-SIG signature scheme has a public key consisting of n 2 quadratic polynomials in n variables where n = 160, 192, 224 or 256. Under the assumption that solving systems of n 2 MQQ's equations in n variables is as hard as solving systems of random quadratic equations, we prove that in the random oracle model our signature scheme is CMA (Chosen-Message Attack) resistant.
Introduction
Multivariate quadratic schemes (MQ schemes) are an active research area since their introduction more than 26 years ago in the papers of Matsumoto and Imai [25, 31] . They have a lot of performance advantages over classical public key schemes based on integer factorization (RSA) and on the discrete logarithm problem in the additive group of points defined by elliptic curves over finite fields (ECC), but they have also one additional advantage: there are no known quantum algorithms that would break MQ schemes faster than generic brute force attacks.
We can say that MQ schemes can be generally divided in five types of schemes that conceptually differ in the construction of the nonlinear quadratic part of the scheme. There is a nice (but a little bit older survey from 2005) [49] that covers the first four classes of multivariate quadratic public key cryptosystems: MIA [25] , STS [44, 33, 23] , HFE [36] and UOV [28] .
The fifth scheme MQQ was introduced in [21, 22] in 2008. MQQ is based on the theory of quasigroups and quasigroup string transformations. Since it had interesting performance characteristics, it immediately attracted the attention of cryptographers trying to attack it. It was first successfully cryptanalysed independently by Perret [39] using Gröbner basis approach, and Mohamed et al. using MutantXL [35] . Later, improved cryptanalysis by Faugère et al. in [17] explained exactly why the MQQ systems are so easy to solve in practice.
In this paper we describe a digital signature variant of MQQ (called MQQ-SIG). To thwart previous successful attacks, we propose to use the minus modifier, i.e. to remove some equations of the public key. More specifically, we remove 1 2 of the public equations of the original MQQ public key algorithm. We also present numerical (experimental) evidence that gives us arguments to believe that Gröbner bases approach (and having in mind that MutantXL approach is equivalent) is ineffective in solving the remaining known equations.
Thus, based on the assumption that solving n 2 quadratic MQQ's equations with n variables is as hard as solving systems of random quadratic equations, we show that in the random oracle model our signature scheme is provably CMA resistant.
The properties of MQQ-SIG digital signature scheme can be briefly summarized as:
• In the random oracle model it is provably CMA resistant under the assumption that solving n 2 MQQ's quadratic equations with n variables is as hard as solving systems of random equations; • Its conjectured security level is at least 2 n 2 ;
• The length of the signature is 2n bits where (n = 160, 192, 224 or 256);
• The size of the private key is between 401 and 593 bytes.
• The size of the public key is between 125 and 512 Kb.
• In software, its signing speed is in the range of 300-3,500 times faster than the most popular public key schemes, and 5 to 20 times faster than other multivariate quadratic schemes with equivalent security parameters; • Its verification speed is comparable to the speed of other multivariate quadratic PKCs; • In hardware, its signing or verification speed can be more than 10,000 times faster than the most popular public key schemes; • In 8-bit MCUs, smart cards and RFIDs, it is hundreds or thousands times faster than the most popular public key signature schemes;
Preliminaries -Quasigroups and Multivariate Quadratic Quasigroups
Here we give a brief overview of quasigroups and quasigroup string transformations. A more detailed explanation can be found in [5, 12, 47] .
Definition 1. A quasigroup (Q, * ) is a groupoid satisfying the law
This implies the cancelation laws x * y = x * z =⇒ y = z, y * x = z * x =⇒ y = z. Note also that the equations a * x = b, y * a = b have unique solutions x, y for each a, b ∈ Q. Given a quasigroup (Q, * ) five so called "parastrophes" (or "conjugate operations") can be adjoint to * . Here, we use only two of themdenoted by \ and /, -defined by
Then (Q, \) and (Q, /) are quasigroups too and the algebra (Q, * , \, /) satisfies the identities
Conversely, if an algebra (Q, * , \, /) with three binary operations satisfies the identities (3), then (Q, * ), (Q, \), (Q, /) are quasigroups and (2) 
Recall that each k-ary Boolean function f (x 1 , . . . , x k ) can be represented in a unique way by its algebraic normal form (ANF), i.e., as a sum of products
. . , where the coefficients α 0 , α i , α i,j , . . . are in the set {0, 1} and the addition and multiplication are in the field GF (2) .
The ANFs of the functions f i defined in Lemma 1 give us information about the complexity of the quasigroup (Q, * ) via the degrees of the Boolean functions f i . In general, for a randomly generated quasigroup of order 2 d , d ≥ 4, the degrees are higher than 2. Such quasigroups are not quadratic and thus are not suitable for our construction of multivariate quadratic PKC. In [21, 22] the authors give sufficient conditions a quasigroup to be a MQQ as well as an algorithm for finding MQQs up to the order of 2 5 . That work was later extended in [10] for constructing MQQs of order 2 d for any d. The common characteristic of the MQQs produced by those two methods is that the quasigroups are bilinear. Namely, the equations (4) describing a multivariate quadratic quasigroup (Q, * ) can be expressed in the following form:
where 
where
, the vector c is a random d-dimensional vector with elements in GF (2) and all of them are generated by a uniformly random process. The matrix U(x) is an upper triangular matrix with all diagonal elements equal to 1, and the elements above the main diagonal are linear expressions of the variables of x = (x 1 , . . . , x d ). It is computed by the following expression:
where the matrices U i have all elements 0 except the elements in the rows from {1, . . . , i} that are strictly above the main diagonal. Those elements can be either 0 or 1 generated by a uniformly random process. Additionally, we require the quasigroups to satisfy the following two conditions:
where the matrices B fi are 2d×2d Boolean matrices defined from the expressions
The reasons why we need the additional conditions (8a) and (8b) will be explained in the beginning of the Section 5. 
Description of the MQQ-SIG Digital Signature Scheme
Our scheme can be expressed as a ( 1 2 ) truncation of a typical multivariate quadratic system:
where S = S · x + v (i.e. S is a bijective affine transformation), S is a nonsingular linear transformation, and P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a central bijective multivariate quadratic mapping defined in Table 1 . It is graphically presented in Fig. 1 . The graphical presentation of the construction of the central mapping P using the quasigroup operation * is shown in Fig. 2 , and its inverse P −1 constructed with the parastrophe operations \ and / is shown in Fig. 3 . The generation of the public and private key is defined in Table 2 . Let us denote by D(y) the composition of inverse operations S −1 , P −1 and
. Also, let us denote by E(x) the mapping of a vector x with the public polynomials
. . , n. Both signing and verification for MQQ-SIG are graphically presented on Fig. 4 while the algorithmic steps for the signing procedure are presented in details in Table 3 , and the verification steps in Table 4 .
Design Rationale

Nonsingular Boolean Matrices in MQQ-SIG
The nonsingular Boolean matrices that are used in MQQ-SIG are generated in a specific way. In general, we need n 2 bits to store a randomly generated hal-00778083, version 1 -18 Jan 2013 Generation of the public and the private key for MQQ-SIG scheme.
Input.
Integer n, where n = 32 × k and k ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8}.
Output. A public key P given by because we need it in the process of signing. With our proposed sizes for n = 160, 192, 224, 256, storing S −1 would require between 3.125 and 8.0 Kbytes. The idea of reducing the size of the keys in MQ schemes by using circulant matrices has been applied previously in several works [51, 46, 40] . Instead of using one circulant matrix, we use two. The rationale why and how we construct the private linear (affine) transformations from them is given in what follows.
In order to compress the private information for the linear and affine transformations we define nonsingular matrices S by the following expression:
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Output.
A signature sig = (x0, x1).
Compute the pair
where Hash() is the standardized hash function. Here we assume that the output of the hash function is n bits, and that h0 and h1 are where 
We chose the permutations σ . From S we will obtain the affine transformation
In words: we construct the bits of the vector v by constructing two arrays. (10) are due to the fact that the inverse matrix of any circulant matrix is again circulant [11] . Thus, if we would use a circulant matrix S −1 , its inverse S that is used in the production of the public key would be also circulant. From a cryptographic point of view, we wanted to avoid the circular property of S since its strong regularity. This strong regularity might affect the randomness of the multivariate quadratic expressions in the public key. We have made a tradeoff between the totaly non-circulant matrix S generated completely by a uniformly distributed random process which will cost a lot in terms of space, and the regular circulant matrices, by using two circulant matrices that are combined as it is described in the expression (10) . The obtained S from S −1 is without the circulant regularity, and still we can store it in just 2n bytes.
To illustrate our technique for producing non-circulant matrices S −1 and S we give the following baby example with n = 16 and where rotations to the left are performed by 2 positions.
Let σ 12 5 14 2 6 7 9 0 10 11 8 4 1 15 13 3 . Since this is a baby example, we have to adopt the expression (10) for this smaller value of n. The adopted expression is:
and we get 
Note that S is not a circulant matrix.
Choosing the Order and Characteristics of Quasigroups
In the original MQQ proposal [21, 22] , the authors used several different multivariate quasigroups of order 2 5 . That design decision was mainly done because the authors did not know how to construct MQ quasigroups of bigger order.
In the meantime, Chen et al., in [10] and Samardjiska et al., in [42] have found ways how to construct MQQs of arbitrary order 2 d . Thus, we have decided to use quasigroups of order 2 8 . That decision was made in order to match the byte size of 8 bits. This enables efficient implementations of MQQ-SIG even on tiny industrial 8-bit MCUs, as well as on high end systems (PCs or workstations). The left and right parastrophes can be pre-computed each taking 64KBytes. These pre-computed parastrophes can speedup the signing phase at least 10 times, but using pre-computed parastrophes of size 2 d where d > 8 simply becomes too costly. Without going into details of the different characteristics of MQQs produced by methods described in [10] and [42] we can say that for encoding MQQs as described in [42] we need 256 bytes, while for MQQs from [10] we need just 81 bytes (see Proposition 1). This is due to the fact that MQQs in [10] have bi-linear nature, while MQQs constructed in [42] are based on T-functions and generally are not bi-linear.
We have performed experiments with both types of MQQs and after removing n 2 MQQ's expressions from the public key, we have not observed any security consequences of using the bi-linear MQQs from [10] . That fact combined with the fact that the knowledge of MQQ is a part of the private key, and that the encoding of MQQs from [10] needs just 81 bytes (versus 256 bytes for MQQs from [42] ), was the decisive argument in favor of MQQs defined in [10] . In our design we use affine transformation S instead of the linear one S, and we also use a non-zero vector c in the quasigroup construction. The reasons for this is that without S our scheme would have the zeroth vector as a fixed point and the same is true for a quasigroup that has c = 0. We consider that these properties are unnecessary and easily avoidable weaknesses.
Security Analysis of the Algorithm
In this section we will describe all the security analysis we have performed during the design of MQQ-SIG. First we want to emphasize that MQQ-SIG similarly as the original MQQ is still resistant against the well know attacks such as: Patarin's chosen plaintext attack on MIA scheme [37] , the attacks with differential cryptanalysis that were proposed by Fouque, Granboulan and Stern in [19] , solving the isomorphism of polynomials with one secret done by Perret and others in [38, 18, 9] and MinRank attacks. For the resistance against MinRank attacks we want to note that the minimal rank r of the matrices B fi for the nonlinear part of our scheme have to fulfil the conditions (8a, 8b), thus at least one of the ranks is 14 and all of the ranks are at least 12. Additionally, it is not known how to extend the MinRank attack to our scheme, since some equations of the public-key have been removed. In [8] , it has been proved that the attack can be extended when 1 equation is removed in HFE. However, the attack can not be applied in our context when n 2 equations are removed. We suggest the reader to see [21, 22] for the arguments why MQQ-SIG is resistant against these attacks.
Experiments with Gröbner Bases
The public key encryption algorithm MQQ introduced in [21, 22] was quickly shown to be weak against algebraic cryptanalysis. It was broken both by Perret [39] using Gröbner basis approach, and by Emam Mohamed et al [35] using MutantXL. Later Faugère et al [17] explained why the MQQ systems are so easy to solve in practice. To understand their results we must first introduce to concept of degree of regularity.
hal-00778083, version 1 -18 Jan 2013 As explained in [17] , the complexity of computing a Gröbner basis of an ideal depends on the maximum degree of the polynomials appearing during the computation. This degree, called degree of regularity, is the key parameter for understanding the complexity of a Gröbner basis computation [3] . Indeed, the complexity of the computation is polynomial in the degree of regularity D reg , more precisely the complexity is:
which basically correspond to the complexity of reducing a matrix of size ≈ n Dreg . Here 2 < ω ≤ 3 is the "linear algebra constant", and n the number of variables of the system. Note that D reg is a function of n and also of the number of equations m. The relation between D reg , n and m depends on the specific system of equations. This relation is well understood for regular (and semi-regular) systems of equations [1, 2, 3, 4] . However, as soon as the system has some kind of structure, this degree is much more difficult to predict.
In [17] , the authors showed that the degree of regularity of the original public key algorithm MQQ was bounded from above by a small constant. Having in mind the successful and very efficient way how Gröbner bases and XL methods are solving the full systems of MQQ equations, we want to ensure that MQQ-SIG does not have a similar small bound on the degree of regularity. A classical way to avoid this is to remove some equations of the system. Indeed, an under-defined system of equations (n > m) will have an exponential number of solutions. This is an issue since the complexity of Gröbner bases is also related to the number of solutions [15] . To circumvent this problem, a solution is to fix n − m variables (or more [7] ). However, as soon as sufficiently many variables were fixed, we observed that the new system behaved as a "random" system of equations of the same size. This has been also observed and used in the hybrid approach [7] .
To confirm this behavior in our context, we have performed experiments on MQQ-SIG equations systems of reduced sizes. The observed degree of regularity is compared to the expected degree of regularity for a random multivariate system of the same size. The strategy for choosing S has changed during the course of our experiments. The experiments where performed with random Boolean matrices. However, from a security against Gröbner bases attack point of view, the most important feature is that we ensure that the 8 linear expressions are removed from the equations set. Below is our experimental strategy for small-scale version of MQQ-SIG equation systems in n variables: Table 5 . The average degree of regularity for a MQQ signature system in V variables with R equations removed. In parentheses, the expected degree of regularity for a random system of size V − R. (6) 6 (7) · (8) 17 5,00 (5) 5,90 (6) · (7) · (8) 18 5,00 (5) 5,90 (6) · (7) · (8) 19 5,00 (5) 6,00 (6) · (7) · (8) 20 5, 00(5) 6,00 (6) · (7) · (8) 21 6,00 (6) · (7) · (8) 22 6,00 (6) · (7) · (8) 23 6,00 (6) · (7) · (8) 24 6, 00(6) 6 (6) · (7) 25 6 (6) · (7) 26 6 (6) · (7) 27 6 (6) · (7) 28
We have performed 100 experiments for 16, 24,32 and 40 variables. Due to the complexity, the experiments have only been repeated 10 times for 48 variables and just once for 56 and 64 variables. For 56 and 64 variables many of the instances either required more than the 1TB RAM our system has, or did not finish after about 1 month of computation. These instances are marked with a · in the table. We also experienced that 72 variables with 36 equations removed did not finish after about a month of computation. The experiments were done with Magma 2.17-3's implementation [30] of the F 4 [16] algorithm on a workstation with 32 cores based on Intel Xeon 2.27GHz, with 1TB of RAM memory. The results of these experiments are listed in Table 5 . In the table the expected degree of regularity for a random system of equations over GF (2) in V − R variables are also listed in parentheses. These numbers have been calculated using the formula provided in [2] . From the table we see that the bigger percentage of equations we remove from the system, the closer the measured degree of regularity is to a random system of equations. The reason for this is that we are removing crucial relations among terms, thus rendering the remaining sets of equations as random sets of multivariate equations. It is then natural to formulate the following conjecture: Conjecture 1. For every full set of public key equations produced by MQQ as defined in steps 1-3 in Table 2 , removing n 2 of the equations, makes the remaining set of 8 that we use in our MQQ-SIG scheme. In [10] , Chen et al., gave a lower bound on the number of MQQs of order 2 8 . That number is projected to 2 273 . However, we are using additional conditions (8) . By a heuristical measuring we have obtained that approximately one in 2 7 randomly generated MQQs of order 2 8 complies with the conditions (8) . That means that the lower bound of the size of the pool of MQQs of order 2 8 is 2 266 .
Secret Key Leakage Scenarios
Originally this attack was presented to us by an anonymous reviewer of an earlier variant of our scheme submitted to WCC 2011. We would like to express big acknowledgement to that anonymous reviewer.
In a previous version of our scheme instead of y = r 0 ||h 0 , the value y = h obtained as the output of the hashing procedure is n bits long, and the signature part is x = D(y). The following Chosen Message Attack could then be launched. An attacker asks for signatures of 1+n+ n 2 +O(1) messages i.e. he will have the triplets (M i , x i , y i ≡ Hash(M i )). He will then attempt to recover the missing n 2 equations in the public key. Given the missing equations he can successfully launch an efficient Gröbner bases attack.
Consider the extraction of the first missing equation y 1 = P 1 (x 1 , . . . , x n ), which can be expressed in a general form as:
Since the attacker knows the values of 1 + n + This attack is easily mitigated by our strategy to construct the values y 0 = r 0 ||h 0 and y 1 = r 1 ||h 1 where r 0 and r 1 are strings of n 2 randomly generated bits with every signing invocation, and h = h 0 ||h 1 is the hash output that is digesting the message M .
We formulate the previous discussion about the leakage of the private key in the non-randomized MQQ-SIG and its prevention by the following two lemmas: 
−n . For all O(n 2 ) queries this gives us a total probability of (2 −n )
e. the complexity for extracting the hidden part is O(2 n 3 ).
MQQ-SIG Is Provably CMA Resistant
We will use the following definition of security against chosen message attack It is well known that solving multivariate quadratic polynomials is an NPcomplete problem (see for instance [20] ). This theorem is repeated below. In what follows we give a sketch of the proof and the ideas how to use the fact that the verification of the MQQ-SIG signatures depends on the values h 0 and h 1 that are each random multivariate quadratic equations with n variables will be given in the extended version of this paper.
Theorem 1 ([20]). Let
Proof. (sketch) The security parameter input to the generating algorithm is k = n 2 , which controls the number of equations over GF (2) and is directly connected with the value n: the output size of the hash function.
Given the assumption that solving n 2 MQQ equations with n variables is as hard as solving systems of n 2 random multivariate quadratic equations, there are no structural weaknesses of the MQQ equations that can be exploited to solve the system faster then solving n 2 random multivariate quadratic equations. This means the adversary has basically three strategies of breaking MQQ-SIG:
1. To find a collision in the hash digest (h 0 ||h 1 ) of length n = 2k. 2. To solve two systems of n 2 MQ equations with n Boolean variables. 3. Some combination of the two above.
Strategy 1:
Breaking with the strategy 1 means finding a collision for a random oracle with a n = 2k bit output. Interacting with the signing oracle will not help the adversary for this instance, since he is only interested in the output of the random oracle. By the generic birthday attack the adversary needs O(2 k ) queries to the random oracle to find a collision for the whole digest. The probability for a polynomial time adversary to break the signature scheme by finding a collision in the digest is therefore negligible in k.
Strategy 2:Under the assumption that solving the n 2 MQQ equations in n variables is as hard as solving k MQ equations in k variables, we know by Theorem 1 that the probability the adversary solves either of the equations with the strategy 2 is negligible in k. However, to prove that the signature scheme is CMA, we must also show that querying the signing oracle gives the adversary no significant advantage in solving the equations. There are two ways the signing oracle might leak information.
(a) Signing leaks information about the hidden equations:
In Lemma 3 we proved that extracting information about the removed part has complexity O(2 II If the coin lands on tails the signing oracle outputs the evaluation of the encryption function in some random numbers (E(r 0 ), E(r 1 )), and the corresponding random numbers (r 0 , r 1 ). The adversary is then asked if the coin is heads or tails.
Since by the definition of random oracles the output of H(M ) is independent of M , it should be clear that the adversary has no way of winning the game above. This illustrates that from the adversary point of view, there is no difference between querying the signing oracle and evaluating the known equations on random inputs. The fact that the adversary actually has access to the random oracle does not change this conclusion because the adversary has no control over the output of the random oracle.
To summarize this means that signing reveals no information about the hidden equations, and leaks no other information that can be used to solve the equations. The signature scheme is therefore CMA with respect to the strategy number 2.
Strategy 3: First note that finding a k − l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, bit collision in, for instance h 0 , will not help computing the corresponding x 0 . The reason for this is the nature of the random MQ equations, where the solution to the system will drastically change by just flipping one output bit. Namely, each output bit depends on average on
combination of all pairs of variables. This means that the best for the adversary in strategy attack number 3 is to find a collision in either h 0 or h 1 , and to solve the equation system for the part that a solution is not known. This requires "just" O(2 k 2 −1 ) calls to the random oracle. However, the adversary still needs to solve a system of k equations in 2k variables, proven to be CMA resistant by the arguments under the attack strategy number 2.
Non-applicability of Successful Attacks against STS on MQQ-SIG
An anonymous reviewer for IMACC 2011 (to whom we express big acknowledgement) has pointed out an interesting comment that MQQ-SIG scheme looks similar as STS schemes and thus the successful attacks that have broken STS schemes may also break MQQ-SIG. Here we explain the crucial and essential differences between STS and MQQ-SIG schemes and the non-applicability of successful attacks against STS on MQQ-SIG. The Stepwise Triangular Scheme was introduced by Wolf et al., [48] as a generalization of earlier multivariate quadratic schemes, such as [45, 34, 24, 26] . The main purpose of the generalization in [48] was to show how all these schemes, and the whole STS family in general, is either insecure or impractical. The general attacks presented exploit the chain of kernels introduced by the triangular structure of the hidden polynomials.
There are at least two important reasons why this attack is not applicable on MQQ-SIG. First, even tough the kernel of two adjacent sub-blocks share half of each others variables, the triangular structure of the hidden polynomials does not result in a chain of kernels. The production of the public key in MQQ-SIG is essentially parallel and chained for the whole n-dimentional space, while the hal-00778083, version 1 -18 Jan 2013 production of the public key in STS is essentially sequential with increasingly larger embedded subspaces. It is this structure that the attacks on STS exploit.
The second reason is that the attacks linearly combine the public key expressions in order to get ranks within certain values. Non-applicability of these attacks against MQQ-SIG is due to the fact that half of the public key expressions are removed, and linearly combining the remaining half in order to obtain low ranks does not necessarily produce vectors from the kernel of the transformation T −1 .
Operating Characteristics
In this section we discuss the sizes of the private and public key as well as the number of operations for verification and signing. 
The Size of the Public and the Private Key
Since the public key consists of n 2 randomly generated multivariate quadratic equations, the size of the public key follows the rules given in [49] . So, for n bit blocks the size of the public key is 0.5 × n × (1 + n(n+1) 2 ) bits. The private key of our scheme is the tuple (σ 0 0 , σ 1 0 , * ). The corresponding memory size needed for storage of the private key is 2n + 81 bytes.
In Table 6 , there are two columns for the size of the private and public key and as we can see for MQQ-SIG the size of the public key for n ∈ {160, 192, 224, 256} is in the range from 125 up to 521 KBytes. We want to emphasize that recently Samardjiska and Chen in [43] have proposed extension of their algorithms for construction of MQQs over arbitrary finite fields and that by their construction it is possible to reduce the huge public key size of MQQ-SIG to be in the range 2.3 -8.8 Kbytes.
Performance of the Software Implementation of the MQQ-SIG Algorithm
We have implemented MQQ-SIG in C for the SUPERCOP benchmarking system [6] and tested it together with the corresponding RSA [41] and ECC [32, 29] (actually ECDSA) and several other multivariate quadratic systems such as: Rainbow [14] , enhanced TTS [50] and 3ICP [13] . In Table 6 we give the comparison of the mentioned signatures schemes where the measurements were performed in 64-bit mode of operation on Intel Core i7 920X machine running at 2 GHz. Although, our C code is not yet optimized for the key generation part, we expect that the performance of key generation part to be the most time consuming part of our algorithm. From the Table 6 it is clear that in signing of 59 bytes MQQ-SIG is faster than RSA in the range from 300 up to 3500 times, and is faster than ECDSA in the range from 140 up to 200 times. If we exclude the time for hashing the messages, signing operations in MQQ-SIG in Table 6 take from 2,500 up to 5,000 cycles. MQQ-SIG is also significantly faster than other multivariate methods such as Rainbow, TTS or 3ICP and that performance advantage in the signing procedure is in the range from 5 to 20 times.
The verification speed in our code is not optimized so far. We expect the optimized verification speed of MQQ-SIG to be in the range of Rainbow, TTS and 3ICP.
Conclusions
We have constructed a multivariate quadratic digital signature scheme MQQ-SIG based on multivariate quadratic quasigroups.
By learning about the weaknesses of the previous attempt to design a multivariate quadratic scheme based on quasigroups -MQQ, by analyzing the successful attacks on all existing MQ schemas, and by our experimentally supported assumption that solving n 2 quadratic polynomials with n variables is as hard as solving random systems of equations, we have designed a digital signature scheme that in the random oracle model is provably CMA resistant and that we believe is strong enough to attract the attention of the cryptographic community.
The efficiency of producing digital signatures of our scheme outperforms all the existing signature schemes (RSA, ECDSA and other MQ schemes) in the range from 5 up to 3,500 times. The speed of verification of our scheme is similar to the other MQ schemes. However the MQQ-SIG scheme that was described in this paper has an unpractically big public key. The ongoing research efforts are in this direction and soon we can expect MQQ-SIG variants with significantly smaller public keys.
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We believe that its superior performance will allow an employment of strong and fast authentication protocols based on the paradigm of the public key cryptography in many new areas of our modern society.
